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Abstract
This paper investigates the determinants of rapeseed hail insurance and pesticide use decisions using individual
panel data set of French farms covering the period from 1993 to 2004. Economic theory suggests that insurance
and prevention decisions are not independent due to risk reduction and/or moral hazard effects. Statistical tests
show that the pesticide use and hail insurance demand are endogenous to each other. An econometric model
involving two simultaneous equations with a mixed censored/continuous dependent variables is then estimated.
Estimation results show that rapeseed insurance demand has a positive and signiﬁcant effect on pesticide use and
vice versa. Insurance demand is also positively inﬂuenced by the yield’s coefﬁcient of variation and the loss ratio,
and negatively inﬂuenced by proxies for wealth (including CAP subsidies) and activity diversiﬁcation.
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11 Introduction
In recent years, agricultural risk management has become a key issue of agricultural policy reforms. The context has
indeed changed deeply. Price support policies1, which provide farmers an economic safety net in addition to income
support, tend to disappear under the pressure of world trade liberalization and environmental concerns, raising the
issue of price risk management in a liberalized world (World Bank, 2005). At the same time, a substantial number of
production risks due to climatic and phytosanitary hazards remain uninsurable without government support in favor of
crop insurance (World Bank, 2005). Under free trade, production shocks are no longer compensated by rises in prices,
a “natural hedge” of farmers’ revenues that renders useless the need for crop insurance in autarky. The importance of
climatic and phytosanitary risks as well as price volatility are thus calling for policy responses. The usual argument for
risk policies in agriculture relies on the incompleteness of contingent claims markets that makes competitive markets
inefﬁcient in the short term. Such inefﬁciency provides a theoretical argument, in certain circumstances, for second-
best Pareto improving government interventions that would mimic such absent contingent claims markets and restore
the correct price incentives (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981; Innes, 1990). In the long term, incomplete insurance and/or
credit market lead to a too high, socially inefﬁcient farm turnover, some viable agricultural ﬁrms being artiﬁcially
unable to survive to temporary shocks (Kirwan, 2009).
Despite these well-founded theoretical justiﬁcations2, the consensus is far too be reached about the true costs and
beneﬁts of government crop insurance programmes that take place in real world. Crop insurance markets are usually
plagued by various kinds of market failures, making the distinction between welfare-enhancing and redistributive
objectives particularly uneasy. Since in developed countries crop insurance programmes often involve substantial
ﬁnancial support from governments, this raises the issue of “disguised subsidies”. In addition to being highly con-
troversial in terms of their pure risk-sharing beneﬁts, it is frequently pointed out that government risk management
programmes (in particular crop insurance ones) may have adverse environmental consequences. In particular, they
would incite farmers to produce more, on more degraded lands, by using higher levels of risk-increasing inputs such
as fertilizers and selecting shorter crop rotations, the same crucial critics that were already addressed to the classical,
price-support based, agricultural policies of the 70’s-80’s .
In the European Union, growing attention is also being paid to weather risks in agriculture in a context of pro-
found reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (hereafter CAP). The European system differs from the U.S. one.
Price risks used to be managed at the EU level through guaranteed prices while weather risks and crop insurance
programmes, when they exist, are under the responsibility of Member States. Guaranteed prices have decreased due
to CAP reforms and have been replaced by decoupled agricultural subsidies to support farm revenues, with an a priori
ambiguous impact in terms of farmers’ risk aversion (more risk due to less price protection but less risk aversion
due to a wealth effect). This has lead Member States to assess the possibility of a crop insurance programme at the
E.U. level. Enlarging the perimeter of mutualization for risks that are considered as systemic at the National scale has
probably some economic sense, but the lessons from the costly U.S. experience certainly incite regulators to prudence.
This paper deals with multiple risks decision making in agriculture by investigating the determinants of rapeseed
hail crop insurance and pesticides uses, using an individual panel data set of French farms covering the period from
1993 to 2004. We ﬁrst propose a theoretical background, and then follow the reduced form approach and build an
econometric model involving two simultaneous equations with a mixed censored/continuous dependent variables to
account for potential endogeneity, which we estimate.
Related empirical literature.— The relation between production and insurance/hedging decisions is a central as-
pect of the welfare and redistributive impacts of crop insurance programmes. There is a large empirical literature on
farmers’ choices involving risk that intend to estimate how risk preference do indeed affect farmers’ production and
ﬁnancial choices, and how these choices interact (Just, 2000; Just and Pope, 2003). Most papers concern the U.S.
case, in part because several reforms of Federal risk management programmes have stimulated empirical research on
this topic. Many papers focus on the relation between insurance and production choices, providing some empirical
testing of the possible distorsive effects of risk management instruments (eventually magniﬁed by public subsidies):
Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) results suggest that crop insurance has encouraged pesticide and fertilizer input uses
for corn producers in the U.S. Midwest. This contrasts with Smith and Baquet (1996), whose estimations show that
1through public storage in the European Union or Target Prices in the United States
2Such normative result must be qualiﬁed. Indeed, the welfare gains, eventually losses, from risk policies have been shown to be highly
sensitive to changes in parameters, especially supply and demand elasticities (Newbery and Stiglitz (1981), Innes (1990)). More profound is
the critics by Dixit, who considers that welfare gains coming from government interventions may be highly overestimated because classical
models implicitly assume governments to be immune to the fundamental causes that make market collapse, such as moral hazard, adverse
selection or imperfect observability
2fertilizer and pesticide inputs for Kansas wheat producers tend to be negatively correlated with insurance purchases.
Wu (1999) is the ﬁrst to extend the analysis to acreage decisions as a risk diversiﬁcation tool. In his estimation of the
effect of crop insurance on crop acreage allocation and pesticide use in Central Nebraska Basins, he shows that crop
insurance participation encourages producers to switch to crops in higher economic values. In a more recent paper,
Goodwin et al. (2004) study the acreage effects of crop insurance using the samples of corn and soybeans produc-
tion in the U.S. Corn Belt and wheat and barley production in Northern Great Plains. They estimate a simultaneous
equation model to take into account a larger set of endogenous risk decisions of agricultural producers to simulate the
possible effects of large premium changes. Their results suggest a relatively modest acreage responses to expanded
insurance subsidies.
Some general conclusions can be drawn from the existing empirical literature. First, risk management choices are
generally endogenous, suggesting possible substituability or complementarity between risk management instruments.
Second, typical explanatory variables that may inﬂuence farmers’ risk aversion such as yields’ coefﬁcients of varia-
tion, ﬁnancial ratios (an imperfect measure of liquidity constraint), farmers’ wealth, land ownership are most of the
time statistically signiﬁcant. This tends to support that risk do indeed matter in farmer’s production decisions. Third,
although statistically signiﬁcant, some variables have in some cases a small quantitative effect (O’Donoghue et al.,
2009), in other cases strong quantitative effects, suggesting prudence in drawing too general policy conclusions at
the national scale. Fourth, most empirical studies3, mainly based on U.S. data, did not lead to clear cut conclusions
concerning the sign of the correlation between pesticide and insurance decisions4, although the fact that both deci-
sions are made endogenously are rarely challenged5. Since many producers’ decisions involve risk considerations, it
is difﬁcult to build a theoretical model that would capture an exhaustive analysis of their interactions (Goodwin et al.,
2004) and yield unambiguous results, even in a static model. The classical moral hazard framework does not include
multiple sources of risks, adverse selection, price risk, which may be potential explanations of these contradictory
results6.
The current paper contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, instead of relying on aggregated time-
series or cross-section data as in most of previous studies, we use farm-level data. This is expected to provide us with
a more precise description of individual decisions. Second, the current study uses panel data, which possess several
advantages over conventional cross-sectional or time-series data sets, while exploiting genuinely observed regime
transitions. At last, this paper contributes to the growing literature on the empirical analysis of risk management
decisions in the case of France and other European countries (Koundouri et al., 2009; Mosnier et al., 2009).
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the empirical model followed by a description of the
data and estimation results. We conclude in section 3 with a summary of our results and research perspective.
2 Empirical model
2.1 Econometric model
We now turn to the econometric model in order to examine hail insurance and pesticide use decisions. Our data set
does not include insurance coverage itself but insurance expenses, for each crop. The usual way in the literature is to
consider the demand for insurance as a binary variable identifying whether the farmer participates or not (Horowitz
and Lichtenberg, 1993; Smith and Baquet, 1996; Wu, 1999). This is a limitation of these studies which focus on the
decision of insurance purchase only and not take into account the level of coverage in the analysis. In spite of absent
data, we choose to approximate the demand for insurance by the premium per unit area divided by the mean product
per unit area, i.e. crop yield times crop price, calculated on the total years available. Such normalization by the mean
product allows to eliminate the mechanical increase in premium coming from an increase in the value of the insured
3Another group of papers also deal with farmers’ risk-taking decisions but differ in their econometric approach of the cited ones by building
structural instead of reduced-form models. The advantage of such approach is to allow for simultaneous estimation of production technology
parameters and risk preferences. Examples of papers ﬁtting with this approach are Chavas and Holt (1996) and more recently and Koundouri
et al. (2009) to evaluate the risk and wealth effects of agricultural policy changes towards decoupling in the European Union.
4Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) have found a positive correlation between crop insurance and chemical input use for corn producers in
the U.S. Midwest. However, Smith and Goodwin (1996) demonstrated that fertilizer and chemical use for Kansas wheat producers tended to
be negatively correlated with insurance purchases. Wu (1999) and Goodwin, et al. (2004) suggest no clear relationship between crop insurance
demand and input use.
5Using Hausman-Wu test, Goodwin et al. (2004), Smith and Baquet (1996) and Wu (1999) have found that insurance, crop mix, and
chemical use decisions are not exogenous and should be estimated using a simultaneous equations approach.
6Theory suggests that the demand for risk-reducing inputs should be lower for those who buy insurance than for those who do not buy
because of a standard moral hazard effect. This moral hazard argument has been the cornerstone of empirical studies and discussions on the
subject in the USA.
3output in the case of a linear transaction cost function.
Our approach follows the empirical literature on crop insurance and production decisions, such as pesticide use
(Horowitz and Lichtenberg, 1993; Smith and Baquet, 1996), cultivation practices (Goodwin et al., 2004) and cropping
patterns (Wu, 1999). We thus ﬁt into the simultaneous equation approach framework. To investigate the determinants
of crop insurance demand under endogenous input use decision, we estimate our model using individual farm panel
datacoveringtheperiodfrom1993to2004insteadoftheusualcrosssectionaldataset. Ourdatasetallowsustocapture
individual farmers effects and also to follow the evolution of farmers’ choices over a long period of time. Panel data,
by taking into account the inter-individual differences and intra-individual dynamics have several advantages over
cross-sectional or time-series data. In our case the two most important advantages are to have more accurate inference
of model parameters and to control the impact of farmer’s individual heterogeneity.
Following the empirical literature, we consider that the farmers’ crop insurance and pesticide input use deci-
sions are made jointly. Our econometric model thus corresponds to two simultaneous equations with a mixed cen-















it is the latent variable for the farmer’s i insurance demand at time t, Iit is the observed demand insurance
for the farmer i, Pit is the pesticide input demand of farm i at time t, X0
1it and X0
2it are vectors of explanatory variables,
b1;g1;g2;b2 areparameterstobeestimated,w1it andw2it areerrorterms, i=1;::::;N indexesthefarmersandt =1;:::;T
indexes time period of observation. The error term wmit (m = 1;2) is decomposed as
wmit = mmi+emit; m = 1;2; i = 1;:::N; t = 1;:::T; (3)
where mmi is the individual effect for the farm i and the variable of decision m and emit is an i.i.d. error term for
equation m.
We make the following distributional assumptions:
mmi ,! N(0;s2
mm); emit ,! N(0;s2








semk if i = j and t = s;
0 otherwise,
for all m;k = 1;2, i; j = 1;:::N, and t;s = 1;:::T.
The model (1-2) has a mixed structure since it includes both a latent variable and its dichotomous realization.
Procedures for estimating simultaneous equation models in which one or more equation contains limited dependent
variable have been developed by Amemiya (1974), Amemiya (1979) and Nelson and Olson (1978). Nelson and
Olson (1978) propose a simple two stage estimation procedure where endogenous variables are replaced by predicted
values obtained at ﬁrst stage by regression upon an instrument set. This two-step procedure has the advantage to give
consistent estimates of the coefﬁcients of the model, however Amemiya (1979) shows that this two-step procedure
misrepresents the true variances of parameters. Bootstrapping methods were proposed in the literature to estimate
consistently the parameters of the matrix of variance covariance.
Following the literature, we estimate our model by a two-stage procedure (Maddala, 1983)7. In order to obtain
consistent estimates of the parameters of the variance-covariance matrices we use bootstrap methods proposed by
Efron (1979) and Efron (1987). The bootstrapping approach consists in drawing with replacement a large number of
pseudo-samples of size N (which correspond to the number of observations in the observed data). For each sample
7Our model corresponds to the model 2 in Maddala (1983).
4the two-step procedure is applied in order to generate a distribution of consistently estimated parameters. Such an
approach provides consistent variance-covariance parameter estimates that are robust to heteroscedasticity.
Since our sample consists of panel data, we have to choose between a random effect and a ﬁxed effect speciﬁca-
tion. We assume a random effect model because the ﬁxed effect speciﬁcation suffers from the incidental parameters
problem8. In the case of Tobit model, Greene (2004) shows that the incidental parameters problem causes a down-
ward bias in the estimated standard deviations in the Tobit model speciﬁcation. Such problem might lead to erroneous
conclusions concerning the statistical signiﬁcance of the variables used in the regressions.








it includes all the exogenous variables in X0
1it and X0
2it. This ﬁrst step of the procedure provides us with
estimates of the parameters P1, P2 as well as the matrix of variance covariance of individual effects and iid error
terms. In our case, we estimate the equation in (4) by a random effect Tobit model and the equation in (5) by ML-RE
model. In the second step, we estimate the equation (1) by RE-Tobit after substituting b Pit for Pit and the equation (2)
by RE-ML after substituting b I
it for I
it. This two stage procedure gives consistent estimates of the model coefﬁcients
(Maddala, 1983), but the estimates of variance of the coefﬁcients may be inconsistent because predicted values of the
endogenous variables are used in the second stage of the estimation procedure.
Marginal effects.— Computation of elasticity measures requires calculation of marginal effects from the RE-Tobit
model9. Given the censored nature of insurance demand equation different marginal effects can be computed for
each explanatory variable. For each explanatory variable xj, we have calculated at the mean of the sample, the three
elasticities10:
1. Conditional elasticity: which measure for each explanatory variable the elasticity of the expected insurance
demand given that the farmer holds an insurance contract.
Elaconditional =




E(IjI >;x = x)
(6)
2. Probability elasticity: which measure for each explanatory variable the elasticity of the probability that a farmer
holds an insurance contract.
Elaproba =
¶ lnPr(I > 0jx = x)
¶ lnxj
=





3. Unconditional elasticity: which measure for each explanatory variable the elasticity of the expected insurance
demand
Elaunconditional =
¶ lnE(Ijx = x)
¶ lnxj





E(Ijx = x) = Pr[I > 0jx = x]E[IjI > 0;x = x]; (9)
we can easily show that for each explanatory variable, the total elasticity is the sum of the probability elasticity
and the conditional elasticity:
Elaunconditional = Elaconditional +Elaproba (10)
8The incidental parameters problem of the maximum likelihood estimator in the presence of ﬁxed effects (MLE/FE) was ﬁrst analyzed by
Neyman and Scott (1948) in the context of the linear regression model.
9As proposed by Wooldridge (2002) the marginal effects were estimated by making the normalization of the individual-speciﬁc effects such
as E(m) = 0.
10see Greene (2008).
52.2 Data description
The study is conducted on a sample of French farmers from the Departement of Meuse. Our data are provided by the
Management Centre (Centre de Gestion de la Meuse). Our sample is an unbalanced panel observed between 1993 and
2004. One interesting feature of our database is that it contains detailed information for each crop on major inputs:
fertilizers ( N, P, K), pesticide inputs (herbicides, fungicides, insecticides, and growth regulators) and insurance.
As shown in table 1, approximately 88% of farmers in our sample hold a hail insurance contract. This proportion
remained almost constant over the observation period 1993-2004, varying between a minimum of 81.90% in 1993
and a maximum of 91.25% in 2002.
Table 1: Farms who hold a hail insurance contract
Year Total number % of farmers who hold














Summary statistics presented in table 2 show that on average the farmers who hold a rapeseed hail insurance
contract had less CAP subsidies than farmers without hail insurance contract. They are also more specialized in
rapeseed production and have less animal production revenues (related to their total revenues).
2.2.1 Choice of explanatory variables
According to the literature, the demand for crop insurance and risk-reducing input could be inﬂuenced by farms’
characteristics such as farm’s diversiﬁcation, wealth, and liquidity constraints. We hereafter construct some proxies
for these variables as explanatory variables of insurance demand.
Diversiﬁcation.— The degree of farm’s diversiﬁcation is expected to have a negative effect on insurance demand
and pesticide use since it can be considered as a substitute to insurance as a risk management instrument. We con-
sider two forms of farm diversiﬁcation: crop diversiﬁcation which refers to the classical rotation choice, and activity
diversiﬁcation which refers to the relative shares of crop activities taken as a whole with other sources of farms’
revenues, i.e. livestock in our sample. Several index provide consistent measures of the degree of diversiﬁcation,
namely the Herﬁndahl index and Theil index of entropy. With two activities only, relative shares in the farm’s total
output constitute a simpler measure of diversiﬁcation. Computation of these index revealed that they are indeed highly
correlated. We thus choose to restrict to a single measure. Since we have only three crops and two activities (crop and
livestock), we deﬁne crop diversiﬁcation as the share of rapeseed in the total crop product (scol_produit) and activity
diversiﬁcation as the share of livestock in the total farm product (sanim_produit). Note that since livestock activity is
assumed exogenous, the activity diversiﬁcation index can also be interpreted as a wealth effect.
Wealth.— If farmers display decreasing absolute risk aversion, then wealthier farmers may perceive less of a need
to insure. There is not any real consensus in the literature in building a proxy for wealth in similar studies (farms’ net
present values, size index such as land area). The following proxies for farmers’ wealth are included.
Non-crop revenues. As livestock activities provide returns that are independent to crop ones, we can interpret the
activity diversiﬁcation index as a proxy for wealth in addition to a diversiﬁcation one.
Farm size. Many studies in the literature include a measure of farm size as a proxy for wealth. It also captures
6Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Deﬁnition
primassph_col premium per unit area / mean yield
col_pacph CAP subsidies per ha
sanim_produit share of animal revenue
scol_produit share of rapeseed production
loss_ratio sum of indemnities / sum of premium
ratio_liq debts / assets
ind_ferm =1 if land renting
puthf percent of family labor
cvrdt_col CV of rapeseed yield
col_laglnprix log rapeseed lagged price


















































the effect of economies of scale on the demand for insurance. We thus include the agricultural area (SAU11) as an
explanatory variable.
CAP income support. Agricultural income support policies are also a major part of farmers’ revenues, and can
therefore be a strong component of the farmers’ wealth effect. Hence CAP subsidies are also included as a proxy of
farmers’ wealth (col_pacph) as an explanatory variable.
Financial characteristics.— Financial characteristics of the farm such as debt and liquidity constraints are strongly
expected to affect insurance and input choices through their impact on farmers’ risk aversion. More liquidity con-
strained farmers would insure more ceteris paribus. We have built the three following ratios in order to capture such
liquidity constraint: the total debt ratio, the land debt ratio and the liquidity ratio (ratio_liq). These three ratios are
expected to have a positive effect on insurance and input uses. For the same liquidity constraint reason, farmers who
rent land are expected to buy more insurance and use more pesticides because they are more leveraged (Wu, 1999).
We thus include a rent index (ind_ferm).
Loss ratio.— The demand for insurance is expected to depend on the expected return from insurance (usually
negative), which includes premiums and expected indemnities. To capture such factor, we use individual farmers’
loss ratios (loss_ratio), a variable that is equal to the total indemnities divided by total insurance premiums for the
available years. Since our panel is unbalanced, differences due to catastrophic events that arise some years can be
a source of bias between farmers (Goodwin, 1993). However, excluding these years from our analysis would also
create some bias and weaken the analysis so we kept all available years in our sample. Heterogeneity in loss ratios can
be due to by asymmetric information if farmers are more informed that insurers about the distribution of their yield
risk. Goodwin (1993), Just et al. (1999) and more recently Goodwin et al. (2004) provided empirical evidence of the
importance of such factor on the incentive to insure in the U.S. agricultural context.
11Surface Agricole Utile in French.
7Yield variation.— In order to catch the effect of crop risk on insurance and pesticides, we include as it is usually
the case in the literature12, the individual coefﬁcient of variation of yield (cvrdt_col). Intuitively, a high coefﬁcient of
variation reﬂects a higher crop risk exposure, thus an incentive to get insured.
Labor composition.— Total labor includes hired labor and family labor. The composition of the total labor could
give us an idea of the nature of farm management. We build an index, puthf, which is equal to the share of family
labor in the total farm labor (Wu, 1999).
2.3 Estimation results
Are insurance demand and pesticide use endogenous? The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test.— To test the simultane-
ous equation speciﬁcation adopted in our model, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman13 test was performed to test the hypothesis
that: (1) crop insurance decisions are exogenous to pesticide use and (2) pesticide use is exogenous to crop insurance
decisions. Results of these tests are presented in table 3 and show that the exogeneity hypothesis is rejected for the
variablepesticideinput intheinsurance demandequationandfor theinsurancedemand inthepesticideinput equation.
These results suggest that there exist some unobservable factors that might inﬂuence both crop insurance demand and
pesticide use. We therefore need to control for correlation between those unobservables and crop insurance demand
and pesticide use which provides a strong reason for our simultaneous equation model.
Table 3: Durbin-Wu-Hausman test results
Null Hypothesis DWH statistic DF Test result
crop insurance demand is 14.05 7 Rejected at 5% level of conﬁdence
exogenous to pesticide use
pesticide use is exogenous 19.43 9 Rejected at 2% level of conﬁdence
to crop insurance demand
Model estimation.— We estimate a simultaneous equation model of crop insurance demand and pesticide use for
rapeseedusingthetwo-stageprocedureproposedbyNelsonandOlson(1978)withabootstrappingmethodtoestimate
consistent parameters of the variance-covariance matrices. Estimations are made on rapeseed only because this crop
exhibits the higher coefﬁcients of variation than wheat and barley.
The estimation results are presented in Table 4. Table 4 displays the insurance model as a function of our explana-
tory variables and the pesticide choice equation. As can be seen by inspecting the results the signiﬁcant variances of
individual random effects conﬁrms the advantage of using panel data and modeling individual effects. We conclude
that the classical regression model with one single constant term is inappropriate and that there exist in the data indi-
vidual heterogeneity captured by individual random effects. The elasticities Elaunconditional,Elaconditional and Elaproba
(equations 6-8) are computed at the means of all variables and are presented in Table 5. The signiﬁcant variables in
Table 4 also have signiﬁcant marginal effects (elasticities) in Table 5.
Concerning the parameters estimates, a ﬁrst important result is that the quantity of pesticides (col_qphytophhat)
used by farmers increases with the demand for insurance (primassph_col). Moreover, the demand for insurance
increases with pesticides. As we have noted earlier, the empirical literature provided no consensus on the sign and
magnitude of the effects of insurance on pesticide use. Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) results suggest that crop
insurance has encouraged the chemical input use for corn producers in the U.S. Midwest. However, Smith and
Goodwin (1996) demonstrated that fertilizer and chemical use for Kansas wheat producers tended to be negatively
correlated with insurance purchases. Wu (1999)) has focused on the effect of crop insurance on crop patterns and
chemical use in Central Nebraska Basins. The results show that crop insurance participation encourages producers to
switch the crops in higher economic values. Thus, the expected relationship between insurance participation and input
use is unclear. The results of Goodwin, et al. (2004) suggest a relatively modest acreage responses to the increases in
crop insurance participation.
Our estimation results concerning the effects of diversiﬁcation on insurance demand are in line with our expec-
tations. The variable scol_produit, which measure the share of rapeseed in total crop production has a positive and
12See for example Goodwin et al. (2004).
13The "Durbin-Wu-Hausman" (DWH) test is numerically equivalent to the standard "Hausman test" obtained using in which both forms of
the model must be estimated. Under the null hypothesis, it is distributed Chi-squared with m degrees of freedom, where m is the number of
regressors speciﬁed as endogenous in the original instrumental variables regression.
8signiﬁcant effect on insurance demand. This means that farmers that planted more rapeseed are less diversiﬁed and
need more crop insurance protection. In the same way, the variable sanim_produit which measure the share of live-
stock activities in the farm revenue has a negative and signiﬁcant effect on insurance demand. This conﬁrm the fact
that activity diversiﬁcation reduce risk aversion and so insurance demand of farmers. Wu (1999) and O’Donoghue
et al. (2009) ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant negative effect of crop diversiﬁcation on crop insurance demand. Con-
cerning activity diversiﬁcation, Goodwin (1993) does not ﬁnd a statistical negative relationship between the extent of
diversiﬁcation into livestock and the tendency to insure. Results concerning diversiﬁcation must be interpreted with
caution. Indeed, a negative correlation can be explained by a substitution effect between risk management tools, but
a positive correlation, if arises, can be explained by heterogeneity in farmers’ risk aversion: ceteris paribus, more risk
averse farmers would diversify more, buy more insurance and use more risk-reducing inputs. Therefore, which of
these effects dominates is likely to depend on the particular application and data set.
As expected, the CAP subsidies col_pacph have a negative and signiﬁcant effect on the insurance demand, which
can be interpreted as a wealth effect. The effect of direct payments on farmers’ risk preferences has been recently esti-
mated by Koundouri et al. (2009) using a structural model to estimate simultaneously risk preferences and technology
parameters. Direct payments were shown to substantially decrease farmers’ degrees of risk aversion.
Estimation results show that a higher yield coefﬁcient of variation of rapeseed (cvrdt_col) appears to be positively
and signiﬁcantly correlated with greater demand for insurance. Such a positive relationship is conform to the intu-
ition. However, the coefﬁcient of variation is in part endogenous due to input uses (in particular pesticides) and crop
diversiﬁcation. For example, more risk averse farmers could insure more against hail risk while using more pesticides
to reduce pest risk, and so exhibit a lower coefﬁcient of variation of yield, calling for cautious interpretation.
The parameter estimate on the composition of total labor (puthf=family labor /professional labor) has a negative
sign but is statistically insigniﬁcant at 10%. As expected, land ownership also affect farmers’ insurance decisions
ind_ferm. Farmers who rent land tend to exhibit a higher demand for insurance.
Another interesting but not surprising result is that higher loss ratio is signiﬁcantly and positively correlated with
greater demand for insurance. As discussed in Goodwin et al. (2004), the fact that both higher loss ratios and higher
yield coefﬁcients of variation are positively correlated with insurance demand suggest that the cost of insurance as
well as size of the risk reduction do indeed matter in farmers’ insurance decision. Finally, the parameter estimates of
the liquidity ratio ratio_liq has the expected sign but is not signiﬁcant.
Marginal effects.— We now compute elasticities to get some insight about the magnitudes of the relations between
variables. The results are presented in Table 5. First, we note that this magnitude is quite small concerning the
relation between insurance and pesticides: the probability to buy insurance increases by 0.026% when pesticide use
increases by one percent. Unconditional elasticity, which sums up the probability to buy insurance with insurance
demand when positive, is equal to 0.056 %. Such ﬁgures should be interpreted cautiously since they may be the
result of several effects, some of them acting in opposite directions: the moral hazard effect, which predicts a negative
relationship between insurance demand and pesticide use, and the risk reduction effect, which predicts a positive one.
In the present region study, it seems however reasonable to think that the moral hazard effect is not very important in
practice because of the presence of insurers’ auditing concerning input uses. Moreover, the fact that the insured risk
displays low geographical correlation at the departement level, the perceived probability of being audited by farmers
may be sufﬁciently high to deter the moral hazard incentive. The positive, although quite modest, elasticity value of
pesticide use and provides some support to the risk reduction effect of insurance.
Heterogeneity in farmers’ risk aversion can also explain such positive correlation but is unobservable. In this
case, a low value for elasticity could be explained by unobservable heterogeneity in pesticide productivity. Indeed,
pesticides not only reduce risk but also increase expected yields. The latter motive may be predominant in farmers’
pesticide use decisions, explaining low values of elasticities.
These elasticity results shed some light on the complex interaction between insurance and pesticide choices at
the farm level. Although the estimated ﬁgures seem to be small, they may be the result of countervailing incentives
and/or unobservable heterogeneity. Therefore making predictions about the consequences of crop insurance reforms
in France on pesticide use should take these limits into consideration. During the period 1993-2004, available private
insurance contracts protected against hail risk only. Other production risks such as drought were managed through the
public fund FNGCA. Expanding the number of risks insured by private insurance contracts would give farmers more
freedom to choose their combination of risk management tools at the farm level. This may increase the magnitude of
the relation between insurance demand and pesticides.
We now discuss the other factors affecting insurance demand. Classifying them with respect to the value of the
probability elasticity and unconditional elasticity in decreasing order, we get 1. the rent index, 2. the yield’s coefﬁcient
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of variation, 3. CAP subsidies per ha, 4. activity diversiﬁcation and 5. the loss ratio.
The values of elasticities for the yield’s coefﬁcient of variation (cvrdt_col, 0.117 and 0.255) conﬁrms the role
of farmers’ heterogeneity in risk exposure on insurance demand. The other explanatory variables have interesting
consequences for agricultural policy. First, CAP subsidies (col_pacph) have a negative but quite small impact on the
probability to insure (-0.088), but a rather high one on total insurance demand (-0.192). This suggests that the wealth
effect due to farmers’ income support plays a non-negligible role in reducing the consequences of income shocks due
to weather events. If such income support decreases due to forthcoming CAP reforms, farmers of our sample would
be more disposed to increase their demand for risk-management tools such as insurance against weather events.
Estimated elasticities for activity diversiﬁcation (sanim_produit) have the same order of magnitude than these for
CAP subsidies (-0.074 and -0.161), suggesting that income diversiﬁcation is also a substantial substitute for crop
insurance in our region study.
Estimated elasticities for loss ratios (loss_ratio), considered as a proxy for the cost of insurance, are rather small
(0.023 and 0.049 respectively). This suggests that a crop insurance policy based on premium subsidies should not lead
to strong changes in insurance demand against hail risk. These results are in line with previous studies in the United
States. In this country, only large levels of premium subsidies allowed to increase the rate of penetration of insurance
at the national scale. Moreover, in many cases expected indemnities are higher than premiums, rendering insurance
contracts valuable even for risk-neutral producers. The situation is quite different in France, where hail insurance is
a "mature" market, with a large rate of penetration rate and decades of existence without any government subsidy
(the average loss ratio of our sample is 0.791). Hence it is not so surprising that the impact of a change in the cost
of insurance has modest effects on insurance demand. Intuitively, such impact could be more substantial for multiple
peril crop insurance contracts, introduced through a public-private partnership in France in 2005, since they provide
coverage against an extended set of risks, some of them displaying strong spatial correlation, hence higher premiums.
From a theoretical perspective, literature shows that a risk-averse individual14 always buys insurance against a low
14In fact, any individual having preferences that display the second-order stochastic dominance property.
10probability-high loss event if he buys insurance for any other risk having the same expected loss. This suggests that
crop insurance contracts extended to low frequency risks (typically drought) would always be bought by farmers who
already have a hail insurance contract under identical transaction costs. However several factors are susceptible to
curb insurance demand for this extended set of risks. First, these risks may not only differ in their distribution but
also in their transaction costs. Insurance premiums are more difﬁcult to calculate for less frequency risks, and spatial
correlation as well as ambiguity may imply premium overloading by insurers. Second, there is substantial empirical
evidence that shows individuals are reluctant to buy insurance against low probability events, or even do not consider
at all risks under a certain probability threshold. At last, the insurance decision requires processing information and
learning, so emerging insurance contracts may require a time lag for adaptation.








col_qphytophhat 0.056** 0.030** 0.026**
(2.36) (2.35) (2.36)
col_pacph -0.192*** -0.104*** -0.088***
(-5.77) (-5.76) (-5.67)
sanim_produit -0.161*** -0.087*** -0.074***
(-4.40) (-4.43) (-4.32)
scol_produit -0.023 -0.012 -0.010
(-0.84) (-0.84) (-0.84)
loss_ratio 0.049*** 0.026*** 0.023***
(3.75) (3.76) (3.71)
ratio_liq 0.004 0.002 0.002
(0.35) (0.35) (0.35)
ind_ferm 0.305** 0.164** 0.140**
(2.29) (2.29) (2.29)
puthf -0.079 -0.043 -0.037
(-1.49) (-1.49) (-1.49)
cvrdt_col 0.255*** 0.138*** 0.117***
(13.34) (13.75) (11.81)
t statistics in parentheses
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
3 Conclusion and discussion
This paper investigates the determinants of hail insurance and pesticide use decisions using an individual panel
dataset of French farms covering the period 1993-2004. Statistical tests show that the pesticide use and insurance
demand are endogenous to each other. An econometric model involving two simultaneous equations with a mixed
censored/continuous dependent variables is then estimated.
The results of our estimation are twofold. First, it is conﬁrmed that insurance demand has a positive effect on
pesticide use and vice versa, providing empirical support for the interdependence of technical choices and insurance
decisions. However, itisalsoshownthatthemagnitudeofthisrelation, measuredbyelasticities, isquitesmall. Several
explanations are proposed for this result: the presence of countervailing incentive effects of insurance (risk reduction
and moral hazard), the ambiguous role of risk-decreasing inputs on the variance of yield, or the preponderance of the
expected proﬁt motive versus the risk-reducing one in pesticide use decisions by farmers. From an environmental
policy perspective, this suggests that reforms aiming at facilitating the access to insurance against an expanded set of
risks or reducing the cost of insurance may have positive but modest effects on pesticides use. With monoperil hail
insurance contracts, moral hazard temptations concerning the use of pesticides may be more easy to control than for
multiperil crop insurance contracts, for two reasons. The ﬁrst one is that estimating the relative impact of pest and
climate shocks on the ﬁnal yield may be more difﬁcult when multiple climate shocks enters the insurance contract.
Another problem associated with multiple peril insurance contracts is that increasing the number of covered peril
could possibly increase correlation across individual claims, thus lower the probability of audit.
Second, the analysis of the explanatory factors of insurance demand conﬁrm theoretical predictions and have
interesting consequences for agricultural policy analysis. CAP subsidies have been shown to have a statistically
11signiﬁcative and negative inﬂuence on insurance demand, and in turn on pesticide use. This is in line with the
assumption that farmers’ preferences are characterized by decreasing absolute risk aversion, conﬁrming results of
several other studies in France and abroad. From an agricultural policy perspective, this suggests that decrease in CAP
subsidies would increase the farmers’ propensities to pay for risk management instruments, underlying the need for
an integrated approach between income support and risk management policies in this sector. Activity diversiﬁcation
has also a statistically signiﬁcant and negative inﬂuence on insurance demand, which conﬁrms the assumption that
whole-farm diversiﬁcation is a substitute to insurance and risk-reducing inputs. More surprising is the fact that crop
diversiﬁcation is not statistically signiﬁcant. This suggests that diversiﬁcation is more an issue at the whole-farm level
than at the crop acreage level. This points out interesting questions in terms of environmental policy in the agricultural
sector. Indeed, our results suggest that encouraging crop rotations against monoculture would have no statistically
signiﬁcant impact on the intensity of pesticide use per hectare. Crop rotations thus may be chosen for other reasons
than risk. They can be more proﬁtable in expectation due to positive external effects between crops that follow each
other, or be the result of other constraints such as soil qualities, which are not included in our data set. Our results
show that farmers with riskier yields tend to buy more insurance, which is in line with theoretical predictions. The loss
ratio, has a signiﬁcant effect but of small magnitude on insurance demand, suggesting a low price elasticity of demand
for insurance. Crop insurance premium subsidies could thus have small impacts on insurance demand. However, it
should be noted that the insurance contracts that are analyzed in the present study are not the same than those that
are actually subsidized in France, which cover multiple risks. Finally, we have shown that ﬁnancial ratios are not
statistically signiﬁcant, which is also surprising.
Future challenges.— The results of this study could be enhanced and continued in several ways.
First, we do not consider price risk in our analysis. This is clearly a shortcut since theory suggests that production
and insurance decisions are distorted when prices risk is introduced. Moreover, the CAP reforms of the 90’s and
beginning of 2000’s signiﬁcantly decreased price ﬂoors for major crops in the European Union, leading to a potential
increase of real or perceived price risk for farmers. However, futures and forward markets were also available in
France during the period covered by our sample, allowing farmers to transfer price risks to ﬁnancial markets and so
signiﬁcantly reduce the importance of price risk. Unfortunately, farmers’ positions on futures and forward markets
are not available in our database, preventing us to include price hedging decisions in our analysis.
Second, our data concerning phytosanitary products are aggregate expenses, which include a set of speciﬁc inputs
targeted to different sources of risks (moisture, etc.). It is possible that some producers are more exposed to some
speciﬁc risks that are more costly to self-insure than others. We have assumed a continuous relation between the
quantity of pesticides used (measured by the expenses) and the magnitude of loss reduction. In reality, the timing of
application may be also determinant, so equal applied quantities with different fractioning can lead to different results
in terms of loss reduction, but these actions are not observable. Phytosanitary (as well as fertilizer) decisions have in
fact a dynamic nature, which can include observation and learning by the producer. Such ingredients would suggest a
more subtle theoretical framework but is out of the scope of this paper.
Third, it would be interesting to build a structural model that would allow joint estimation of technology and
preferences. This requires to deepen the theoretical analysis of the joint demand for insurance and pesticides with two
independent risks. This would allow us to conﬁrm our results concerning the shape of farmers’ preferences as well as
making useful comparisons with results obtained elsewhere, in particular Mosnier et al. (2009) in the French case.
References
Amemiya, T. (1974). Multivariate regression and simultaneous equation models when the dependent variables are
truncated normal. Econometrica 42 (6): 999–1012.
Amemiya, T. (1979). The estimation of a simultaneous-equation tobit model. International Economic Review 20(1):
169–181.
Chavas, J.-P. and Holt, M. T. (1996). Economic behavior under uncertainty: a joint analysis of risk preferences and
technology. Review of Economics and Statistics 78: 329–335.
Efron, B. (1979). Bootstrap methods: another look at the jackknife. The Annals of Statistics 7(1): 1–26.
Efron, B. (1987). Better bootstrap conﬁdence intervals. Journal of the American Statistical Association 82 (397):
171–200.
12Goodwin, B. K. (1993). An empirical analysis of the demand for multiple peril crop insurance. American Journal of
Agricultural Economics 75(2): 425–434.
Goodwin, B. K., Vandeveer, M. L. and Deal, J. L. (2004). An empirical analysis of acreage effects of participation in
the federal crop insurance program. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 86: 1058–1077.
Greene, W. (2004). Fixed effects and bias due to the incidental parameters problem in the tobit model. Econometric
Reviews 23(2): 125–147.
Greene, W. (2008). Econometric Analysis, 6th Edition. Pearson International Edition.
Horowitz, J. K. and Lichtenberg, E. (1993). Insurance, moral hazard and chemical use in agriculture. American
Journal of Agicultural Economics 75(4): 926–935.
Innes, R. (1990). Government target price intervention in economies with incomplete markets. The Quarterly Journal
of Economics 105: 1035–1052.
Just, R.E.(2000).Someguidingprinciplesforempiricalproductionresearchinagriculture.AgriculturalandResource
Economics Review : 138–158.
Just, R. E., Calvin, L. and Quiggin, J. (1999). Adverse selection in crop insurance: Actuarial and asymmetric infor-
mation incentives. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 81(4): 834–849.
Just, R. E. and Pope, R. D. (2003). Agricultural risk analysis: Adequacy of models, data, and issues. American Journal
of Agricultural Economics 85: 1249–1256.
Kirwan, B. E. (2009). Adversity and the propensity to fail: The impact of disaster payments and multiple peril crop
insurance on u.s. farm exit rates. Working Paper .
Koundouri, P., Laukkanen, M., Myyrä, S. and Nauges, C. (2009). The effects of ue agricultural policy changes on
farmers’ risk attitudes. European Review of Agricultural Economics 36: 53–77.
Maddala, G. S. (1983). Limited dependent and qualitative variables in econometrics. Cambridge, England: Cam-
bridge University Press. : 401 p.
Mosnier, C., Reynaud, A., Thomas, A., Lherm, M. and Agabriel, J. (2009). Estimating a production function under
production and output price risks: An application to beef cattle in France. Working Papers 09.10.286, LERNA,
University of Toulouse.
Nelson, F. and Olson, L. (1978). Speciﬁcation and estimation of a simultaneous-equation model with limited depen-
dent variables. Source: International Economic Review 19(3): 695–709.
Newbery, D. M. and Stiglitz, J. E. (1981). The Theory of Commodity Price Stablisation Rules. Oxford University
Press.
Neyman and Scott (1948). Consistent estimates based on partially consistent observations. Econometrica 16, 1-32.
16: 1–32.
O’Donoghue, E. J., Roberts, M. J. and Key, N. (2009). Did the federal crop insurance reform act alter farm enterprise
diversiﬁcation? Journal of Agricultural Economics 60: 80–104.
Smith, V. H. and Baquet, A. E. (1996). The Demand for Multiple Peril Crop Insurance: Evidence from Montana
Wheat Farms. American Journal of Agricultural Economics : 189–201.
Wooldridge, J. (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
World Bank (2005). Managing Food Price Risks and Instability in an Environment of Market Liberalization. Report
32727-GLB, The World Bank.
Wu, J. (1999). Crop insurance, acreage decisions and nonpoint-source pollution. American Journal of Agicultural
Economics 81(2): 305–320.
13